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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Max Ritchie Cooke appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury verdict
finding him guilty of second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault,
challenging the admission of prior threats against the victim and the prosecutor's
reference to those threats. Cooke also appeals from the denial of post-conviction
relief claiming the district court erred in concluding his counsel was not ineffective
for failing investigate or challenge the victim's competency to testify at trial.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Criminal proceedings'
Cooke and his wife, Alison Cooke, separated in November, 2002, and
Alison moved in with her brother. (#34820 Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.69, L.lO, p.325,
Ls.10-12.) Just prior to and following the separation, Cooke made various
threats directly to Alison and to others about Alison because he believed she was
involved with another man. (#34820 Tr., p.116, L.25 - p.117, L.18, p.127, Ls.15-

' There are two records relating to the criminal proceedings - Docket No. 30187
and Docket No. 34820. Cooke voluntarily dismissed the appeal in Docket No.
30187 because the notice of appeal was timely only from the Amended
Judgment of Conviction, which dealt only with the issue of credit for time served,
an issue Cooke did not wish to pursue on appeal. (Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
filed April 8, 2004, Docket No. 30187.) The district court, however, entered a
Second Amended Judgment of Conviction on November 15, 2007, for the
purpose of permitting Cooke to pursue the instant appeal (Docket No. 34820)
(#34820 R., p.81), after finding Cooke's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a timely notice of appeal (#32447, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
filed November 13, 2007, p.4 (augmentation)). The Idaho Supreme Court has
issued an order taking judicial notice of the transcript and Clerk's Record filed in
Docket No. 30187 and ordered the preparation of a limited Clerk's Record to
include any additional documents listed in the Notice of Appeal filed in Docket
No. 34820. (#34820 R., p.3.) The record and transcript prepared for Docket No.
34820 will be referred to as "#34820 R." and "#34820 Tr." The record previously
prepared in Docket No. 30187 will be referred to as "#30187 R."

18, p.275, L.10

- p.276, L . l l , p.278, L.22 - p.279, L.4, p.295, Ls.23-25, p.336,

Ls.11-15.) Those threats included threats to kill.
On January 18, 2003, Cooke sat outside Alison's brother's home in the
cold for over an hour, waiting for Alison to come home from a night out with
friends. (#34820 Tr., p.410, L.16 - p.411, L.7.) When Alison pulled up to the
house, Cooke came out from behind a "bush or a tree" and over to Alison's truck
window. (#34820 Tr., p.339, L.23

- p.340,

L.5.) Cooke started interrogating

Alison about where she had been and yelling at her for being a "bad mother."
(#34820 Tr., p.340, Ls.8-13.) At some point, Cooke got into Alison's truck with
her and a struggle ensued over the keys. (#34820 Tr., p.340, L.25 - p.341,
L.lO.)

Cooke ultimately gained control of the keys and sped off, driving

erratically, with Alison in the truck. (#34820 Tr., p.341, L.9 - p.342, L.22.) Alison
subsequently crawled into the backseat to get away from Cooke who was
pushing her and pulling her hair. (#34820 Tr., p.342, L.3 - p.343, L.8.) Cooke
then stopped the truck, got out, opened the back door, pulled Alison's pants and
underwear down, pulled his pants down, and told her "he was going to be the last
one." (#34820 Tr., p.344, L.9 - p.345, L.8.) Fortunately, for some reason, Cooke
abandoned his apparent plan to rape Alison, and instead got back in the truck
and, once again, began driving erratically and at a high rate of speed. (#34820
Tr., p.346, L.11 - p.347, L.5.) Unfortunately, however, the incident did not end
there.
Alison decided to "get back up in the front seat" and "start hitting or
kicking" Cooke in an effort to get him to "slow it down so [she] could jump out or

something just to get away." (#34820 Tr., p.347, Ls.8-11.) As Alison began
climbing over the seat, Cooke drove the truck across the road, through a fence,
and sped toward a tree, and accelerated just prior to hitting the tree. (#34820
Tr., p.347, L.12 - p.349, L.4;

see #30187

Exhibits 10-23.)

Alison hit the

dashboard and fell to the floorboard on the passenger side of the truck. (#34820
Tr., p.151, Ls.5-24, p.349, Ls.6-14.)
Jennifer Novasio, who lived on the property where the crash occurred
awoke and saw Cooke approaching her home, talking on a cell phone. (#34820
Tr., p.147, L.9 - p.148, L.16.) Cooke handed his phone to Mrs. Novasio and told
her to give her address to dispatch, which she did. (#34820 Tr., p.148, L.17 p.149, L.9.) Mrs. Novasio then went out to the truck where she saw Alison laying
on the floorboard. (#34820 Tr., p.151, Ls.5-24.) Mrs. Novasio warned Cooke
not to move Alison due to concern for her injuries. (#34820 Tr., p.151, L.25
p.152, L.6.)

-

Nevertheless, while Mrs. Novasio went to direct the emergency

personnel to Alison's location, Cooke dragged Alison out of the truck. (#34820
Tr.,p.152,L.22-p.153,L.14.)

Cooke told Deputy Brenda Glenn that Alison had been driving and was
drunk, but told one of the firefighters that he had been driving and Alison grabbed
the wheel, causing him to lose control. (#34820 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13, p.163, L.4

- p.164, L.2.)

A subsequent investigation of the scene revealed the truck veered

off the road, to the left, at an estimated speed between 61 and 71 miles per hour,
corrected direction into the path of the tree, and accelerated prior to the collision.
(#34820 Tr., pp.208-47.)

Alison was critically injured as a result of the crash. (#34820 Tr., p.161,
L.22 - p.162, L.15, p.254, L.15

- p.255, L.17.)

Alison's injuries included a brain

injury, a broken jaw, a severe laceration to her lip and face, eight broken ribs, a
punctured lung, and a shattered right leg, which had to be repaired with a rod
and 12 pins. (#34820 Tr., p.351, L.14

- p.352, L.22; #30187 R.,

Alison was in the hospital for several weeks.

Exhibits 2-5.)

(SeeTr., p.469, L.24 - p.470, L.3

(Alison still in hospital on February 11, 2003, more than three weeks after
wreck).) Comparatively, Cooke's injuries were minor. (#34820 Tr., p.250, L.22 p.251, L.7; #30187 Attachments to PSI, pp.104-06.)
The state indicted Cooke on charges of first-degree kidnapping,
aggravated battery, and assault with intent to commit rape. (#30187 R., pp.5-7,
25-26.) Prior to trial, the state filed a Brief in Support of Idaho Rule 404(b)
Evidence ("Brief'). (#34820 R., pp.13-19.) In its Brief, the state indicated its
intent to offer evidence that "would show that the defendant made several threats
to Alison Cooke in the approximately six weeks prior to the crash" including
threats "that he would kill her if he found out that she was talking to another man
or seeing another man." (#34820 R., p.14.) The state noted Cooke made "these
directly to Alison Cooke" as well as "told other people that he would kill Alison if
he found out that she was speaking to another man." (#34820 R., p.14.) The
state's Brief included reference to a specific threat Cooke made to the man
Cooke believed Alison was seeing - namely, that if Cooke "found out that Alison
was speaking to that man, [Cooke] would make 'headline news."' (#34820 R.,
p.15.) The basis for offering the statements was to show Cooke's intent and to

rebut any claim the wreck was "merely an accident." (#34820 R., pp.15-18; see
#34820 Tr., pp.6-9.) At the hearing on the state's request to introduce the
threats, the court concluded the threats were relevant to Cooke's intent and
noted that "though there is always prejudice in those statements," the prejudicial
effect did not outweigh the probative value. (#34820 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.8.)
A jury convicted Cooke of second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery,
and misdemeanor assault. (#30187 R., pp.39-40.) On August 21, 2003, the
court imposed a unified twenty-five year sentence with twelve years fixed for
second-degree kidnapping and a concurrent unified fifteen-year sentence with
seven years fixed for aggravated battery. (#30187 R., pp.48, 63.) The court also
imposed a 90-day sentence for the assault conviction, with credit for 90 days.
(#30187 R., pp.48-49.)
Course Of Post-Conviction ~ r o c e e d i n q s ~
On October 5, 2004, Cooke filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging, in relevant part, ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's
failure to "discredit" Alison's testimony and have her testimony "stricken from the
record" based on her "short term memory loss." (#32447 R., pp.11-17.) Cooke
also filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the district court granted.
(#32447 R., pp.21-23, 30.)

Cooke's post-conviction appeal and his criminal appeal have been consolidated
for purposes of appeal. (Order Granting Motion to Consolidate dated May 8,
2008.) The record and transcripts relating to Cooke's post-conviction case will
be cited as "#32447 R." and "#32447 Tr."

The state filed a response to Cooke's petition denying he was entitled to
relief and, with respect to Cooke's allegations relating to Alison's testimony,
noting Cooke failed to allege how Alison's memory was any different than what
she testified to at trial. (R., pp.34-41.) The court dismissed Cooke's petition but
gave him an opportunity to file an amended petition. (R., pp.43-46.)
Cooke, through counsel, filed an amended petition again alleging counsel
was ineffective in failing to investigate or challenge Alison's competency to testify
at trial. Specifically, Cooke alleged:
[TJhe petitioner relies upon the attached affidavit of Alison Cooke of
May 25, 2005, her letter of July 22, 2004, the medical report of Clay
H. Ward, PhD., and the prior petition filed herein including its
exhibits and attachments. These materials clearly show that Dr.
Ward would have testified that Alison Cooke was not a competent
and reliable witness and at risk for false memories. Had Alison
Cooke been properly cross-examined, her testimony would have
confirmed that and provided the jury with her best recollection that
the defendant did not kidnap her and did not mean to hurt her.
(#32447 R., p.49.)
The Affidavit of Alison Cooke filed in support of Cooke's amended petition
averred:
1)
That I was a witness in the underlying criminal case
(H0300279) involving my former husband Max Ritchie Cooke.
That the letter dated July 22, 2004, attached hereto as
2)
"Exhibit A," is a true and correct copy of my letter that details my
best recollection as to what happened in the accident of January
18, 2003.
That the medical report of Clay H. Ward, PhD, attached
3)
hereto as "Exhibit B," is a true and correct copy of his medical
report diagnosing my injuries, including his opinion that:
I do not believe that the patient is competent or even
appropriate for a police or forensic evaluation or interview at

this time. She does not have any recall of events leading up
to the accident and is still very much in posttraumatic
amnesia. My impression is that her information will likely be
misleading, unreliable, and she is at risk for developing new
memories or false memories rather than accurately recalling
what happened prior to the impact.
That I testified at the above petitioner's jury trial on June 12,
4)
2003, although I did not want to, and that Dr. Ward's opinion of my
memory state was still correct at that time, and I was not mentally
competent to understand what was going on at that time.
(#32447 R., pp.54-55.)
The letter attached to Alison's affidavit as "Exhibit A is dated July 22,
2004. (#32447 R., pp.56-58.) In the letter, Alison states her recollection of the
accident and the events leading up to it but claims she has "no memory of the
trial" and states she is "not sure of even how [she] could have been able to
testify."

(#32447 R., pp.56-58.) Alison's letter also states her "belie[q that

Cooke "lost control of the truck for some reason," and that she did not "feel" she
was "kidnapped." (#32447 R., pp.57-58.) It appears the letter was prepared for
purposes of "reconsidering [Cooke's] sentence on the kidnapping charge."
(#32447 R., p.58.)
Dr. Clay Ward's report, attached as "Exhibit B," was dictated January 23,
2003 (#32447 R., pp.59-61), five days after the accident, 19 days before she was
interviewed by law enforcement (#34820 Tr., p.469, L.24

- p.470, L.3), and five

months prior to her testimony at trial (#34820 Tr., pp.312-391). In addition to the
information excerpted in Alison's affidavit, Dr. Ward noted Alison was able to give
a "fairly reliable biographical history" and was "improving rapidly." (#32447 R.,
pp.59-60.)

The state filed a response and motion to dismiss Cooke's amended
petition and an affidavit from Cooke's trial counsel, who averred he saw "no
reason" to call any medical expert to discuss Alison's "mental ability" because her
"mental ability was clearly before the jury." (#32447 R., pp.76-78.) The court
held a hearing and granted the state's motion. (#32447 9/28/2005 Tr.; R., pp.8588.) With respect to the dismissal of Cooke's claim that counsel was ineffective
in relation to Alison, the court stated:
The Court finds that there is no showing in the Amended
Petition that trial counsel was ineffective in any respect as to cross
examination of the victim, Allison [sic] Cooke. There is no evidene
that Ms. Cooke was incompetent to testify regardless of her current
opinion. The Court takes notice that when Ms. Cooke testified, she
was oriented as to time and place and was able to testify that she
remembered certain things and did not remember others. She was
responsive to questions and was appropriate in every respect. The
jury was informed through her testimony that she had some
memory lapses.
The report of Dr. Clay Ward, which is attached to the
Amended Petition, refers to Allison [sic] Cooke's condition at the
time of the crash. It gives the Court no information concerning
Allison [sic] Cooke's condition at the time she testified, which was
about five months later. t h e Court is satisfied that Ms. Cooke was
competent to testify. The petitioner has not carried his burden to
show that trial counsel was ineffective in any respect regarding Ms.
Cooke.
(#32447 R., p.86.) The court's opinion relating to Alison's trial testimony was
based on the court's recollection, not upon a review of the trial transcript.
Cooke filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.89-91.) The case was
subsequently remanded, pursuant to the state's motion, for a hearing on one of
Cooke's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and for consideration of Alison's
trial testimony. (#32447 Motion for Remand and Statement in Support Thereof

filed December 28, 2006; Order Granting Motion to Remand dated February 2,
2007.)
On remand, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

(#32447

9/26/2007 Tr.) At the hearing, Alison testified that she understood the questions
she was asked at trial and answered those questions to the best of her ability.
(#32447 9/26/2007 Tr., p.53, Ls.1-9.) Alison further testified that she does not
know whether Cooke was trying to hurt her when he drove her truck into a tree
and that she was in the truck with him against her will. (#32447 9/26/2007 Tr.,
p.57, L.6

- p.58, L.7.)

The court then discussed some of Alison's specific trial

testimony regarding what happened just prior to the wreck and asked her if there
was anything "that would cause [her] to alter or change that testimony from the
trial that you testified to under oath earlier?" (#32447 9/26/2007 Tr., p.61, Ls.123.) Alison responded, "No." (#32447 9/26/2007 Tr., p.61, L.24.)
Cooke's trial counsel also testified. (#32447 9/26/2007 Tr., pp.74-103.)
Trial counsel admitted he did not consult a medical professional regarding
Alison's competency, but indicated he did not do so because he believed she
was "competent within the spirit of what she recollected and what she didn't" and
he saw no reason to file a motion to exclude her testimony. (#32447 Tr., p.85,
Ls.17-19, p.96, L.20-p.97, L.6.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made certain findings on the
record, which included a finding that even if trial counsel was deficient in failing to
seek an expert opinion on whether Alison was competent to testify at the time of
trial, Cooke failed to establish prejudice because Cooke failed to present any

evidence that Alison's trial testimony was "inaccurate or untruthful." (#32447
9/26/2007 Tr., p.166, L.20

-

p.170, L.19.) The court subsequently issued a

written order, in which it made the following findings:
The Court heard evidence from both the Petitioner and
Respondent in this case. The Court will find that Allison [sic] Cooke
did in fact have an accurate recall of the events at the time she
testified during the trial and that she was competent to testify. Ms.
Cooke signed an affidavit that on its face appeared to assert that
because of her head injuries, she was not testifying accurately and
truthfully during the course of the trial. The Court, after hearing her
testimony, will find that she had an accurate recollection of what
occurred on the date of this crime and that her testimony has not
been impeached. The Court will further find that there is no basis
to find that the victim was not competent to testify during the trial.
There is no medical evidence before the Court that
demonstrates that at the time of her testimony, she was not
competent to testify. Although there is a letter from a treating
doctor that indicates that she was not competent to testify, that
letter was authored during a period of time that she was
hospitalized shortly after Ms. Cooke had come out of a coma. The
letter does not relate at all to the date of the trial which was several
months later.
The Court, during the course of the trial, went over the
victim's affidavit that was filed in support of the Petitioner's affidavit
and she testified that her recollection was accurate and that she
testified truthfully at the time of the trial. The Court then cannot find
that there is a basis in fact for a new trial because of newly
discovered evidence.

The Petitioner also asserts that there should have been
medical testimony presented that the victim's memory and recall of
this incident would be subject to question and therefore would
create reasonable doubt on the part of the jury. No such evidence
was presented during the course of this proceeding and clearly the
Court will not speculate on this issue.
(#32447 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed November 13, 2007, pp.23 (augmentation).)

ISSUES
Cooke states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court at trial abuse its discretion when it
permitted the State to introduce several of Mr. Cooke's prior
statements into evidence despite the fact that the prejudice
of these prior bad acts outweighs any possible probative
value of this evidence?

2.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct and seek to inflame
the passions and prejudice of the jury against Mr. Cooke
when the State argued evidence of Mr. Cooke's prior bad
acts as demonstrating his propensity to commit the crimes
that he was accused of in this case?

3.

Does the cumulative effect of the district court's error in
admitting the prior bad acts evidence and of the prosecutor's
improper argument regarding this evidence require reversal
of Mr. Cooke's convictions?

4.

Did the district court misapprehend the relevant standard of
competence and make factual findings not supported by
substantial evidence when the court found that Ms. Cooke
was competent to testifL at trial and that Mr. Cooke had not
received ineffective assistance of counsel?

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
The staterephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Cooke failed to establish error in the admission of Cooke's prior
threats towards Alison?
2.
Has Cooke failed to show the prosecutor committed misconduct during his
closing argument, much less that his comments rose to the level of fundamental
error?
Is the doctrine of cumulative error inapplicable since Cooke has failed to
3.
establish any error?
Has Cooke failed to establish the district court erred in concluding Cooke
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to Alison's testimony?

4.

ARGUMENT

I.
Cooke Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Admitting Cooke's
Threateninq Statements
A.

Introduction
During trial, the state presented testimony that Cooke made threats to

Alison directly and to others about Alison and a man with whom he believed she
was having a relationship. Prior to trial, the district court ruled this evidence was
relevant and not unduly prejudicial. On appeal, Cooke claims this ruling was in
error because the court "was without any knowledge of how many of the State's
witnesses would be presenting this evidence or how many of Mr. Cooke's past
threats each of these witnesses would present." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Thus,
Cooke concludes, "the district court was without a proper legal or factual basis
upon which to conclude that the probative value of these allegations was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .." (Appellant's
Brief, p.17.) Cooke's argument lacks legal or factual merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Id.

C.

Evidence Of Cooke's Prior Threats Was Not Unduiv Preiudicial
Evidence is admissible if it is relevant so long as it is not unduly prejudicial

or otherwise subject to exclusion. I.R.E. 402, 403. On appeal, Cooke does not
challenge the district court's determination that Cooke's threats were relevant,
but instead argues only that the district court abused its discretion when it
determined Cooke's threats "did not substantially outweigh the probative value of
these statements." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) More specifically, Cooke asserts
the court could not conduct a proper I.R.E. 403 analysis because it was "without
necessary information about how many witnesses would testify to these
statements, how many statements each witness would testify to, and the specific
content of these statements."

(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

This argument is

unsupported by fact or law.
The state provided the court with adequate information upon which to
base its decision, and Cooke never objected to the adequacy of that information.
In its Brief, the state outlined its theory of the case and advised that Cooke made
"several threats to Alison Cooke" and "told other people that he would kill Alison if
he found out that she was speaking to another man." (#34820 R., p.14.) At the
hearing wherein the parties discussed the threats, the prosecutor further detailed
the nature of the evidence the state intended to offer:
And about November of 2002, particularly about Thanksgiving-time
until the crash, which was the middle of January, so roughly six or
seven weeks, the defendant made a number of statements about
his intention to kill Alison Cooke if she attempted to leave him or if
he found out that she was talking to a fellow on the telephone who
he was suspicious of. That fellow's name is Shane. And he made
those statements to her. And he made the statements to a couple
of her friends and a couple of her relatives, her brother and sister.

On the very night that [the wreck] happened, which was - actually, it occurred early in the morning on Saturday, but it was
Friday night - - the defendant made a call to this Shane, who he
believed was - - or who he believed either was trying to have an
affair with Alison or that Alison was talking to him on the telephone
and said to this Shane on the telephone, "if I find out that Alison has
been talking to you, I'll make headline news." That was within a
couple of hours of the crash, itself.

That the prosecutor did not specifically identify the precise number of
statements the state sought to admit did not render the information provided
inadequate for purposes of determining whether the prejudicial value of the
statements substantially outweighed their probative value.

Nor was the

prosecutor required to relay precisely the threat each witness would testify about
or the precise number of witnesses who would testify in that regard (although the
state did indicate "he made the statements to a couple of her friends and a
couple of her relatives, her brother and sister," to Shane, and to Alison herself
(#34820 Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.3, p.7, Ls.10-18; R., p.14)). Cooke has failed to
cite any authority to the contrary (B

generallv Appellant's Brief, pp.17-20), and

he failed to complain below about the adequacy of the information provided to
the district court in considering the admissibility of the threats
p.9, L.17 - p.11, L.3).

(see#34820 Tr.,

Cooke's argument that the court lacked adequate

information to conduct a proper analysis as required by I.R.E. 403 is without
merit.

Cooke alternatively argues "[elven assuming, arguendo, that the district
court could adequately assess the overall prejudice to Mr. Cooke without
knowing how many statements the State was seeking admission for, the
probativeness of the majority of these statements was low, and was substantially
outweighed by the potential for prejudice."

(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

The

centerpiece of this alternative argument appears to be the timing of some of the
threats relative to the wreck. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Cooke does not identify
what specific statements he believes should have been excluded as unduly
prejudicial due to their time, but instead generally asserts, "Most of the witnesses
testifying regarding Mr. Cooke's prior alleged threats testified to statements made
seven weeks prior to the charges at issue" and gives a reference to several
blocks of pages in the trial transcript. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) A review of
the pages cited reveals that the testimony relates Cooke's threats and actions at
various times between the end of November, when he and Alison separated, up
to the night before the wreck occurred. That some of Cooke's threats were made
at the end of November, approximately seven weeks prior to the wreck, does not
render them unduly prejudicial. Cooke began making threats around the time he
and Alison separated and he continued doing so up until he committed the
crimes in this case. All of those threats were relevant to prove Cooke's intent
and the absence of an accident and any potential prejudice relating to those
statements did not substantially outweigh their probative value. Cooke has failed
to establish otherwise.

II.
Cooke Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During
Closin~Araument. Much Less That His Comments Rose To The Level Of
Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
Cooke did not object at trial to the prosecutor's closing argument.

Nevertheless, he contends on appeal that the prosecutor made improper
comments during closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.)

Cooke has failed, however, to show that the

prosecutor committed misconduct, much less that his comments amounted to
fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial to alleged improper closing

arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial
misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in
fundamental error. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 88, 156 P.3d 583, 589 (Ct.
App. 2007) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280-81, 77 P.3d 956, 96970 (2003)). Such error is fundamental only if it is
"calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence." State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913
(1994).
More specifically, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct during
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded."
Stafe v. Cortez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App.
2001).

Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280,77 P.3d at 969
C.

The Prosecutor's Comments Did Not Constitute Misconduct, Much Less
Fundamental Error That Can Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the

right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969; Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86,
156 P.3d at 587.

The purpose of the prosecutor's closing argument is to

enlighten the jury and help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence.
State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445,450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).
Cooke admits he did not object to any of the prosecutor's closing
argument at trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) As such, this Court cannot consider
his claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument unless the
prosecutor's comments constituted fundamental error. State v. MacDonald, 131
ldaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). Such error is fundamental only if the
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising
therefrom could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing
the jury that the comments should be disregarded. State v. Smith, 117 ldaho
891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State v. Missamore, 114 ldaho 879, 761

P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ames, 109 ldaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct.
App. 1985). Cooke cannot meet this burden.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the evidence from
which the jury could conclude Cooke had the intent necessary to be convicted of
aggravated battery. (#34820 Tr., p.500, L.4 - p.515, L.9.)

In doing so, he

discussed the threats Cooke made to Alison directly and to others about her and
Cooke's verbal abuse towards Alison. (#34820 Tr., p.500, L.18 - p.505, L.24.)
Cooke argues the prosecutor's comments were not offered to show intent, but "to
show propensity to commit the acts charged in the case" and to "inflame the
passions and prejudice of the jury so as to induce them to find Mr. Cooke guilty
based on prior bad acts, rather than on the basis of the actual crimes alleged."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25.) Cooke's argument fails to show error, much less
fundamental error reviewable for the first time on appeal.
All of the testimony regarding Cooke's threats, which the prosecutor
discussed in closing argument, was properly admitted and Cooke has failed to
show otherwise. Cooke has failed to cite any authority for the proposition that it
is misconduct for a prosecutor to refer to evidence that has been admitted at trial,
and has therefore failed to properly present this issue for review. State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966,970 (1996).
Moreover, Cooke cannot establish the prosecutor's discussion of the
evidence was so egregious or inflammatory that any resulting prejudice could not
have been remedied by a curative instruction. Indeed, Cooke seems to suggest
otherwise in that he complains about the lack of an instruction informing the jury
the "prior bad acts evidence was only admissible to demonstrate Mr. Cooke's
intent on the night in question." (Appellant's Brief, p.26 n.5.) Absent such an
instruction, Cooke reasons, "it is entirely probable that the jury believed that it
was entitled to consider the prior bad acts that Mr. Cooke was alleged to have

committed as evidence that he acted in conformity with those prior acts."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) This argument fails for two reasons.
First, Cooke is incorrect that the jury was not instructed regarding the
limited purpose of the "prior bad acts" evidence. (Appellant's Brief, p.26 n.5.)
Instruction 12(a) advised the jury:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing
that the defendant committed wrongs or acts other than that for
which the defendant is on trial.
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to
Drove the defendant's character or that the defendant has a
disposition to commit crimes
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited
purpose of proving the defendant's motive, preparation, plan or
absence of mistake or accident.
(#34820 R., p.44.)
Second, even absent lnstruction 12(a), the failure to give or request an
instruction does not establish misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. The
prosecutor was entitled to discuss evidence of Cooke's prior threats, which was
properly admitted to demonstrate Cooke's intent in relation to the crimes with
which he was charged. That Cooke believes an instruction would have assisted
the jury in limiting the purpose for which it considered that evidence is not
relevant to whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by discussing it in the
first instance.

More importantly, Cooke's belief demonstrates there was no

fundamental error.
The prosecutor's discussion of Cooke's prior threats during closing
argument was nothing more than a fair comment on the evidence properly

admitted at trial and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom. Sheahan,
139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969; Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.
Cooke has thus failed to establish the prosecutor committed misconduct, much
less made comments so egregious and inflammatory they resulted in a denial of
due process.
Ill.
There Is No Trial Error To Accumulate
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.
Stevens,

-I d a h o ,

State v.

191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). A necessary predicate to

application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Id_; State v.
Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Cooke has failed to shbw
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
inapplicable to this case. See, e.&, Stevens, -Idaho at -,

191 P.3d at 226;

LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if
errors in the trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due
process that would require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d
907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288,
301 (Ct. App. 2001) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless).

IV.
Cooke Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Concludincl He Was
Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief Based Upon His Claim That Counsel Was
Ineffective In Relation To Alison's Testimony
A.

Introduction
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Cooke asserted, infer alia, his

attorney was ineffective in failing to investigate Alison's competency to testify at
trial. Cooke offered an affidavit from Alison in support of his petition, which was
admitted at the evidentiary hearing, and called Alison as a witness at the hearing.
The district court ultimately denied relief, concluding Cooke failed to establish
Alison was incompetent to testify at trial and failed to establish prejudice in
relation to her trial testimony. On appeal, Cooke claims the district court erred for
three reasons: (1) the court abused its discretion by failing to admit Alison's
affidavit as evidence at the hearing; (2) the court "entered clearly erroneous
findings of fact, and misapplied those facts to the relevant law, when it
determined that the new evidence presented regarding Ms. Cooke's lack of
competence as a witness did not warrant a new trial;" and (3) the court erred in
determining Cooke's attorney was not ineffective. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-38.)
All of these arguments lack merit.
Alison's affidavit, with the exception of paragraph 3, was admitted at the
evidentiary hearing. Cooke's claim to the contrary is unsupported by the record.
Cooke has likewise failed to establish error in relation to the district court's
factual findings, and he has failed to establish the district court misapplied the
law. The district court correctly concluded Cooke failed to meet his burden of

establishing Alison was incompetent to testify at trial or that counsel was
ineffective in failing to challenge her competency.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and

conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the
district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d
727, 729-730 (1998); Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App.
1994). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
ldaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141
(1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his or her burden of
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d
964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial
court. Rueth v. State, 103 ldaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982).
A district court's determination that a witness is competent to testify is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vondenkamp, 141 ldaho 878, 884,
119 P.3d 653, 657 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

Cooke's Claim That Alison's Affidavit Was Not Admitted As Evidence At
His Post-Conviction Hearina Is Contradicted Bv The Record
Cooke's first claim of error in relation to his post-conviction proceedings is

that the district court "erroneously ruled that Ms. Cooke's affidavit that was
submitted by Mr. Cooke in support of his amended post-conviction petition could
not be considered by the district court because the affidavit contained hearsay."
(Appellant's Brief, p.29.) In support of this argument, Cooke cites to page 38,
lines 17 through 20, of the hearing transcript wherein the following exchange took
place between the court and post-conviction counsel:
[Counsel]: Just so I know, Judge, the affidavit we've already had
admitted?
THE COURT: It's not admitted. I'm going to sustain on that. It's - it contains hearsay.
Although the court did not admit the affidavit as evidence at that time, the
affidavit was later admitted, with the exception of paragraph 3, which was an
excerpt from Dr. Ward's report3 (#32447 Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.55, 1.3, p.135, Ls.17.)

Moreover, it is evident from the court's final order that the affidavit was

considered by the court. (#32447 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Petitioner's Claim of lneffective Assistance of Counsel filed November 13, 2007,

Although this portion of Alison's affidavit was not admitted, it appears Dr. Ward's
report was nevertheless considered by the district court in relation to Cooke's
petition as it was filed with the court (#32447 R., pp.59-60) and referenced in the
court's final order (#32447 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Petitioner's Claim of lneffective Assistance of Counsel filed November 13, 2007,
pp.2-3 (augmentation).)

pp.2-3 (augmentation); 9/26/2007 Tr., p.165, Ls.21-24.) Cooke's first claim of
error in relation to his post-conviction case, therefore, fails.4
D.

The District Court's Findinqs Were Supported BV Substantial And
Competent Evidence And The Court Correctlv Aimlied The Law To The
Facts In Concludinq Cooke Failed To Establish His Attornev Was
lneffective For Failing To Investiqate Or Challenae Alison's Com~etency
To Testify At Trial
1.

General Legal Standards Governinq lneffective Assistance Of
Counsel Claims

In order to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a

post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient

performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 ldaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Araqon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177
(1988); Cowaer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Furthermore, Cooke's claim the district court was required to admit the affidavit
pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4907(a) is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) Section
19-4907(a) merely provides a court "may" "receive proof by affidavits," nothing in
the statute requires it to do so. Moreover, to the extent I.C. § 19-4907(a)
purports to govern the admissibility of evidence, it is "of no force and effect"
where it conflicts with the ldaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 1102.

Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out
a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125
ldaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994).
An appellate court "does not second-guess strategic and tactical
decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for pbst-conviction relief
unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review."
State v. Pavne, -P.3d -,

2008 WL 2447447 *7 (2008) (citing Pratt v. State,

134 ldahb 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000)). What evidence to introduce at trial
and cross-examination are tactical decisions.

ld. at

'24 and *9 n.2; State v.

Osborne, 130 ldaho 365, 372-73, 941 P.2d 337, 344-45 (Ct. App. 1997).
When a post-conviction petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion in his underlying criminal case, the court "may consider
the probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State,
127 ldaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Huck v. State, 124
ldaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "[A] conclusion that the
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally
determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test."

Id. Thus, "[ilf the motion

lacked merit and would have likely been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be
deficient for failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have
been prejudiced by the want of his pursuit."

ld.

2.

The District Court's Factual Findinqs Regardina Alison's
Competencv And Cooke's Failure To Present Evidence
Demonstrating She Was Not Competent To Testifv At Trial Are
Supported By The Record

As an initial matter, Cooke contends the district court's factual findings in
relation to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim were clearly erroneous.
Specifically, Cooke "disputes" the court's findings that Alison's "recollection of
events was accurate at the time of trial, that she was a competent witness, that
there was not medical evidence indicating her incompetence to testify at trial, and
that the medical evidence did not relate to Ms. Cooke's competence on the date
of trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) According to Cooke, these findings are clearly
erroneous because, he contends, Dr. Ward's report, "[co]upled with" Alison's
"actual personal recollection" as set forth in the letter she wrote on July 22, 2004,
demonstrates she was not competent to testify at trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.31.)
Neither Dr. Ward's report nor Alison's July 2004 letter, however, establish Alison
was incompetent to testify at trial.
Dr. Ward's report was prepared five days after the wreck and five months
prior to trial.

It is devoid of any statement that Alison's memory would be

permanently impaired and it did not contain any opinion regarding Alison's
competency to testify at some later date. Dr. Ward merely stated his opinion
Alison was not "competent or even appropriate for a police or forensic evaluation
or interview at th[at] time."

(#32447 R., p.60.) The district court correctly

concluded Cooke presented no evidence that Dr. Ward held the same opinion at
the time of trial or any other evidence that Alison was incompetent to testify.

That Alison wrote a letter one year after she testified in an effort to have Cooke's
kidnapping sentence reconsidered does not establish otherwise.
Moreover, Alison explained at the evidentiary hearing that she understood
the questions she was asked at trial and answered the questions to the best of
her ability. (#32447 9/26/07 Tr., p.53, Ls.1-9.) Cooke failed to establish any of
her testimony was incorrect, inaccurate, or based on a "false memory." The
district court's finding that Alison was competent to testify is supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
With respect to trial counsel's actions in relation to Alison, Cooke has
failed to establish counsel was ineffective. Cooke asserts counsel should have
either filed a motion to exclude Alison as a witness entirely or cross-examined
her more thoroughly regarding her ability to remember the wreck. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.35-37.) Because Cooke did not present any evidence that Alison was
not competent to testify at trial, his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
move to exclude her testimony based on her alleged incompetence must be
rejected because there is no reason to believe such a motion would have been
granted.

See Sanchez, 127 ldaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646.

As for Cooke's claim that counsel did not adequately cross-examine
Alison, counsel's cross-examination strategy is a tactical decision that will not be
second-guessed. Pavne,

P.3d at -,

2008 WL 2447447 *9 n.2; Osborne,

130 ldaho at 372-73, 941 P.2d at 344-45. Moreover, the extent of Alison's
injuries, including her brain injury, was before the jury and a review of the trial
transcript reveals counsel repeatedly inquired into her ability to remember details

and Alison admitted there were things she did not remember. (#34820 Tr.,
p.351, L.14, p.357, L.8 - p.358, L.6, p.359, L.22 - p.360, L.4, p.361, Ls.3-6,
p.362, L.5-p.364, L.3, p.365, L.4-p.366, L.4, p.367, Ls.1-9, p.369, L.8-p.370,
L.8, p.371, L.8 - p.373, L.11.) That Alison's trial testimony was contradicted by
certain prior statements to law enforcement and the fact she minimized Cooke's
intent in her July 2004 letter (Appellant's Brief, p.37), does not establish
counsel's cross-examination strategy was constitutionally inadequate.
The district courts factual findings regarding Alison's competency are
supported by the record and the court correctly applied the law to those facts in
concluding Cooke failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Cooke's claims to the contrary, therefore, fail.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Cooke's convictions for
second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault and the district
court's order denying post-conviction relief.
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